Controlling selection incentives when health insurance contracts are endogenous

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jack, W
• 署名单位: The World Bank
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00103-1
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 25-48
• 关键词: Health insurance; selection incentives; risk adjusters

摘要

The paper examines the nature of health insurance contracts when insurance companies pool high- and low-risk individuals. In a spatial product differentiation model, the normal forces of competition induce quality provision, but selection incentives induce insurers to under-provide quality. To offset selection incentives, the government can reimburse some of the insurers' costs. However, such a subsidy can in some cases reduce quality further, as well as discourage production efficiency. In such cases the optimal reimbursement rate is negative. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.