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作者：Shapiro, JM
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Quasi-hyperbolic discounting predicts impatience over short-run tradeoffs. I present a direct non-laboratory test of this implication using data on the nutritional intake of food stamp recipients. Caloric intake declines by 10 to 15 percent over the food stamp month, implying a significant preference for immediate consumption. These findings constitute a rejection of the permanent income hypothesis and are extremely difficult to reconcile with exponential discounting. The data support an expla...
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作者：Ortega, F
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：A reason why immigration policy is such a contended issue is that often immigrants end up obtaining the right to vote and, hence, may affect future policies. This paper offers a dynamic, general equilibrium model of immigration policy. In each period, a heterogeneously skilled population chooses an immigration policy by majority vote. Voters anticipate that immigration affects the skill premium and the skill composition of the electorate. The main insight is the existence of a trade-off betwee...
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作者：Ludwig, J; Duncan, GJ; Pinkston, JC
作者单位：Georgetown University; Northwestern University; United States Department of Labor
摘要：This paper examines the effects of a randomized housing-voucher program on individual economic outcomes. Public housing residents who are offered relocation counseling together with housing vouchers that can only be redeemed in low-poverty areas experience a reduction in welfare receipt of between 11% and 16% compared to controls. These effects are not accompanied by changes in earnings or employment rates as measured by unemployment insurance records. Offering families unrestricted housing vo...
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作者：Crocker, KJ; Slemrod, J
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：This paper examines corporate tax evasion in the context of the contractual relationship between the shareholders of a firm and a tax manager who possesses private information regarding the extent of legally permissible reductions in taxable income, and who may also undertake illegal tax evasion. Using a costly state falsification framework, we characterize formally the optimal incentive compensation contract for the tax manager and, in particular, how the form of that contract changes in resp...
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作者：Laffont, JJ; Martimort, D
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; University of Southern California
摘要：We analyze the design of incentive mechanisms for the provision of transnational public goods under asymmetric information. Transnational public goods are infrastructures that no single country can afford to build for itself We show that the external constraints imposed by this mechanism may affect consumption, pricing and the true redistributive concerns of local governments. We characterize the corresponding distortions. We also discuss the impact of the preferences for redistribution of the...
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作者：Robinson, JA; Torvik, R
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Norwegian University of Science & Technology (NTNU)
摘要：Underdevelopment is thought to be about lack of investment, and many political economy theories can account for this. Yet, there has been much investment in developing countries. The problem has been that investment growth has not led to output growth. We therefore need to explain not simply underinvestment, but also the missallocation of investment. The canonical example of this is the construction of white elephants-investment projects with negative social surplus. In this paper we propose a...
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作者：Braid, RM
作者单位：Wayne State University
摘要：This paper presents a theoretical model with tax exporting due to external ownership of a fraction theta of the land in each local jurisdiction. There are n local jurisdictions in a metropolitan area (n >= 1) and many metropolitan areas in a world economy. The paper examines the usage of business property taxes and source-based wage taxes by local jurisdictions, first in the presence of and then in the absence of residence-based lump-sum taxes, and how this depends on theta and n. The paper th...
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作者：Koulovatianos, C; Schröder, C; Schmidt, U
作者单位：University of Vienna; University of Kiel; Leibniz University Hannover
摘要：Household consumption exhibits economies of scale as the number of household members increases. We collect survey data from two countries, Germany and France, in order to obtain direct subjective estimates of household consumption economies of scale, and, in particular, to examine an additional dimension: whether household consumption economies of scale change as living standards go up. Our data from both countries indicate strongly that household economies of scale increase as the living stan...
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作者：Currie, J; Fahr, J
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We use data from the National Health Interview Surveys (NHIS) to measure the effects of the growth of Medicaid managed care on children. We examine both the probability that individual children were Medicaid-covered and their utilization of care. We find that managed care penetration has significant effects on the composition of the Medicaid caseload: Young children are less likely to be covered, while poor school-age children are more likely to be covered. When we examine coverage by race, we...
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作者：Fisman, R; Hubbard, RG
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：We present a model of nonprofit governance built on two assumptions: (1) organizations wish to hold precautionary savings in order to smooth expenditures; and (2) it is relatively easy for managers to divert these funds for personal use. Hence, donors face a trade off between expenditure smoothing and donation dissipation. We examine the model's predictions using panel data on U.S. nonprofits. We show that organizations in states with poor government oversight have managerial compensation that...
