-
作者：Joulfaian, D
作者单位：United States Department of the Treasury; George Washington University
摘要：A number of theories have been advanced to explain the size and timing of intergenerational transfers. One factor only recently explored is the effects of taxes, and in particular the estate tax, on such transfers. This paper represents the first attempt to explore how capital gains and gift taxes, in addition to the estate tax, interact to influence incentives in the timing of transfers. Using estate tax data and exploiting variations in state inheritance, gift, and capital gains tax rates, t...
-
作者：Donaldson, D; Pendakur, K
作者单位：University of British Columbia; Simon Fraser University
-
作者：Kugler, M; Verdierb, T; Zenou, Y
作者单位：University of Southampton; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN); Le Mans Universite
摘要：We analyze an oligopoly model in which differentiated criminal organizations globally compete on criminal activities and engage in local corruption to avoid punishment. When bribing costs are low, that is badly-paid and dishonest law enforcers work in a weak governance environment, and the rents from criminal activity are sufficiently high, we find that increasing policing and sanctions can generate higher crime rates. Indeed, beyond a threshold, further increases in intended expected punishme...
-
作者：Alesina, A; Spolaore, E
作者单位：Harvard University; Tufts University
摘要：This paper studies the relationship between international conflict and the size distribution of countries in a model in which both peaceful bargaining and nonpeaceful confrontations are possible. We show how the size distribution of countries depends on the likelihood, benefits, and costs of conflict and war. We also study the role of international law and show how better defined international 'property rights' may lead to country breakup and more numerous local conflicts. (c) 2004 Published b...
-
作者：Helsley, RW; Strange, WC
作者单位：University of British Columbia; University of Toronto
摘要：This paper specifies and solves a two-stage, game theoretic model of a mixed market for crime control. In the first stage of the model, private targets and the government choose levels of policing. In the second stage, criminals choose targets and the severity of the crimes that they commit. The paper's key results are as follows. First, private policing can both divert crime to targets that lack private protection and also increase the severity of the crime that these less-protected targets s...
-
作者：Adam, CS; Bevan, DL
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：This paper examines the relation between fiscal deficits and growth for a panel of 45 developing countries. Based on a consistent treatment of the government budget constraint, it finds evidence of a threshold effect at a level of the deficit around 1.5% of GDP. While there appears to be a growth payoff to reducing deficits to this level, this effect disappears or reverses itself for further fiscal contraction. The magnitude of this payoff, but not its general character, necessarily depends on...
-
作者：Levine, PB; Zimmerman, DJ
作者单位：Wellesley College; National Bureau of Economic Research; Williams College
摘要：We examine the extent to which children are exposed to the welfare system through their mother's receipt of benefits and its impact on several developmental outcomes. Using data from the matched mother-child file from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), we find that children's welfare exposure is substantial. By age 10, over one-third of all children will have lived in a welfare household; black, non-Hispanic children face a much higher rate of exposure. Simple correlations sugge...
-
作者：Andreoni, J; List, JA
-
作者：Potters, J; Sefton, M; Vesterlund, L
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Nottingham; Tilburg University
摘要：We examine contributions to a public good when some donors do not know the true value of the good. If donors in such an environment determine the sequence of moves, two contribution orders may arise as equilibria. Either the uninformed and informed donors contribute simultaneously or the informed contribute prior to the uninformed. Sequential moves result in a larger provision of the public good, because the follower mimics the action of the leader, and in accounting for this response the lead...
-
作者：Gersovitz, M; Hammer, JS
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; The World Bank
摘要：Vector-borne diseases especially rife in poor countries pose sectoral tax/subsidy issues. Preventions and therapies mitigate these diseases in a numerical optimization model combining dynamic epidemiology and economics. The medical distinction between prevention and therapy does not distinguish economic properties of preventions and therapies. Some interventions increase and others decrease moving to the steady state, depending: on the utility function, the targeting of interventions and the d...
