Immigration quotas and skill upgrading

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ortega, F
• 署名单位: Pompeu Fabra University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.06.012
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 1841-1863
• 关键词: MIGRATION; mobility; skills; political economy

摘要

A reason why immigration policy is such a contended issue is that often immigrants end up obtaining the right to vote and, hence, may affect future policies. This paper offers a dynamic, general equilibrium model of immigration policy. In each period, a heterogeneously skilled population chooses an immigration policy by majority vote. Voters anticipate that immigration affects the skill premium and the skill composition of the electorate. The main insight is the existence of a trade-off between skill complementary immigration and the resulting shift in political power. I argue that a reasonably parameterized version of the model is consistent with the main features of US immigration. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.