The design of transnational public good mechanisms for developing countries

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Laffont, JJ; Martimort, D
• 署名单位: Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; University of Southern California
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.03.005
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 159-196
• 关键词: transnational public goods; incentive mechanisms

摘要

We analyze the design of incentive mechanisms for the provision of transnational public goods under asymmetric information. Transnational public goods are infrastructures that no single country can afford to build for itself We show that the external constraints imposed by this mechanism may affect consumption, pricing and the true redistributive concerns of local governments. We characterize the corresponding distortions. We also discuss the impact of the preferences for redistribution of the international agency in charge of designing the mechanism and the role of its ability to enforce that mechanism. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.