Precautionary savings and the governance of nonprofit organizations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fisman, R; Hubbard, RG
• 署名单位: Columbia University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.10.005
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 2231-2243
• 关键词: nonprofit; governance; precautionary savings

摘要

We present a model of nonprofit governance built on two assumptions: (1) organizations wish to hold precautionary savings in order to smooth expenditures; and (2) it is relatively easy for managers to divert these funds for personal use. Hence, donors face a trade off between expenditure smoothing and donation dissipation. We examine the model's predictions using panel data on U.S. nonprofits. We show that organizations in states with poor government oversight have managerial compensation that is more highly correlated with inflows of donations and allocate a smaller percentage of donations to the endowment for future expenditures relative to organizations in strong oversight states. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.