-
作者：Hungerbuhler, Mathias; Lehmann, Etienne
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; University of Namur; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris
摘要：We build a theoretical model to study whether a minimum wage call be welfare-improving if it is implemented in conjunction with an optimized nonlinear income tax. We consider this issue in a framework where search frictions on the labor market generate unemployment. Workers differ in productivity. the government does not observe workers' productivity but Only their wages. Hence, the redistributive policy solves an adverse selection problem. We show that a minimum wage is optimal if the bargain...
-
作者：Evans, Mary F.; Vossler, Christian A.; Flores, Nicholas E.
作者单位：University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville; University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville; University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
摘要：Motivated by efficiency and equity concerns, public resource managers have increasingly utilized hybrid allocation mechanisms that combine features of commonly used price (e.g., auction) and non-price (e.g., lottery) mechanisms. This study serves as an initial investigation of these hybrid mechanisms, exploring theoretically and experimentally how the opportunity to obtain a homogeneous good in a subsequent lottery affects Nash equilibrium bids in discriminative and uniform price auctions. The...
-
作者：Cameron, Lisa; Chaudhuri, Ananish; Erkal, Nisvan; Gangadharan, Lata
作者单位：University of Melbourne; University of Auckland
摘要：This paper examines cultural differences in individual decision-making in a corruption game. We define culture as an individual's accumulated experience, shaped by the social, institutional, and economic aspects of the environment in which the individual lives. Based on experiments run in Australia (Melbourne), India (Delhi), Indonesia (Jakarta) and Singapore, we find that there is a greater variation in the propensities to punish corrupt behavior than in the propensities to engage in corrupt ...
-
作者：Brueckner, Jan K.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：This paper analyzes price and quantity-based approaches to management of airport congestion, using a model where airlines are asymmetric and internalize congestion. Under these circumstances, optimal congestion tolls are differentiated across carriers, and a uniformity requirement on airport charges (as occurs when slots are sold or tolls are Uniform) distorts carrier flight choices. Flight volumes tend to be too low for large carriers and too high for small carriers. But quantity-based regime...
-
作者：Onji, Kazuki
作者单位：Australian National University
摘要：It is common to define benefit eligibility for small business policies by restrictions on the firm size. This paper documents the effects of the value-added tax (VAT) threshold in Japan, focusing on the incentives for a large firm to masquerade as many small firms by separately incorporating business segments. A comparison of the corporate size distributions before and after the VAT introduction of 1989 shows a clustering of corporations just below the threshold-a pattern that is attributable ...
-
作者：Alm, James; Jackson, Betty R.; McKee, Michael
作者单位：University of North Carolina; Appalachian State University; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
摘要：The question for the tax authority is how individuals become aware of enforcement effort. To be an effective tool in reducing tax evasion taxpayers must be aware of the Current audit and penalty regime. We use laboratory experiments to examine the compliance impact of types of information dissemination regarding audit frequency and results. The information includes official information disseminated by the tax authority, and unofficial, or informal, communications among tax payers. Our results,...
-
作者：McAfee, R. Preston; Mialon, Hugo M.; Mialon, Sue H.
作者单位：Emory University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We compare private and public enforcement of the antitrust laws in a simple strategic model of antitrust violation and lawsuit. The model highlights the tradeoff that private firms are initially more likely than the government to be informed about antitrust violations, but are also more likely to use the antitrust laws strategically, to the disadvantage of consumers. Assuming coupled private damages, if the court is sufficiently accurate, adding private enforcement to public enforcement always...
-
作者：Beshears, John; Choi, James J.; Laibson, David; Madrian, Brigitte C.
作者单位：Harvard University; Yale University; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Revealed preferences are tastes that rationalize an economic agent's observed actions. Normative preferences represent the agent's actual interests. It sometimes makes sense to assume that revealed preferences are identical to normative preferences. But there are many cases where this assumption is violated. We identify five factors that increase the likelihood of a disparity between revealed preferences and normative preferences: passive choice, complexity, limited personal experience, third-...
-
作者：Casella, Alessandra; Gelman, Andrew
作者单位：Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University; Columbia University
摘要：Referenda are becoming a common tool for public decision-making, and as reliance on direct democracy increases, so does the importance of giving representation to strongly held minority preferences. This paper discusses a very simple scheme that treats everybody symmetrically but gives weight to intense preferences: voters faced with a number of binary proposals are given one regular vote for each proposal plus a single additional bonus vote to cast as desired. Decisions are then taken accordi...
-
作者：Galiani, Sebastian; Gertler, Paul; Schargrodsky, Ernesto
作者单位：Universidad Torcuato Di Tella; Washington University (WUSTL); University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：The decentralization of public services is a major feature of institutional innovation. The main argument in support of decentralization is that it brings decisions closer to the people, thereby alleviating information asymmetries and improving accountability. However, decentralization can also degrade service provision in poor communities that lack the ability to voice and defend their preferences. In this paper, we analyze the average and distributional effects of school decentralization on ...
