On the optimality of a minimum wage: New insights from optimal tax theory

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hungerbuhler, Mathias; Lehmann, Etienne
• 署名单位: Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; University of Namur; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.11.002
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 464-481
• 关键词: Optimal taxation; Minimum wage; Search-matching unemployment; Bunching; Wage bargaining

摘要

We build a theoretical model to study whether a minimum wage call be welfare-improving if it is implemented in conjunction with an optimized nonlinear income tax. We consider this issue in a framework where search frictions on the labor market generate unemployment. Workers differ in productivity. the government does not observe workers' productivity but Only their wages. Hence, the redistributive policy solves an adverse selection problem. We show that a minimum wage is optimal if the bargaining power of the workers is relatively low. However, if the government controls the bargaining power, then it is preferable to set a sufficiently high bargaining power. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.