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作者：Gonzalez, Francisco M.; Neary, Hugh M.
作者单位：University of Calgary; University of British Columbia
摘要：Social conflict and slow growth are features of many developing economies. This paper considers the role institutions of property rights and conflict management can play in both achieving prosperity and mitigating conflict in these economies. We study how introducing conflict over economic distribution into an otherwise standard model of growth can shape optimal (second-best) taxation policy when diversionary activities cannot be taxed. In this context, we find that the maximization of economi...
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作者：Martimort, David; Semenov, Aggey
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; National University of Singapore
摘要：Polarized interest groups compete to influence a decision-maker through monetary contributions. The decision-maker chooses a one-dimensional policy and has private information about his ideal point. Competition between interest groups under asymmetric information yields a rich pattern of equilibrium strategies and payoffs. Policies are systematically biased towards the decision-maker's ideal point and it may sometimes lead to a laissez-faire equilibrium where the decision-maker is freed from a...
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作者：Engelhardt, Bryan; Rocheteau, Guillaume; Rupert, Peter
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; College of the Holy Cross; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland; University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：This paper extends the Pissarides [Pissarides, Christopher A. Equilibrium Unemployment Theory. Cambridge: MIT (2000)] model of the labor market to include crime and punishment A la Becker [Becker, Gary S. Crime and punishment: an economic approach. journal of Political Economy 76 (1968): 169-217]. All workers, irrespective of their labor force status, can commit crimes and the employment contract is determined optimally. The model is used to study, analytically and quantitatively, the effects ...
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作者：Gathmann, Christina
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：The paper analyzes the effects of tighter border control on the illegal crossing market between Mexico and the United States. Combining panel data on illegal migrants with enforcement statistics, the effects of enforcement are found to be moderate: prices of border smugglers ('coyotes') increased by only 17%, while the demand for smugglers has remained unchanged. Enforcement has however shifted illegal migrants to remote crossing places. Border crossing is now more time-intensive with higher p...
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作者：Diamond, Peter
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
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作者：Huizinga, Harry; Laeven, Luc
作者单位：Tilburg University; International Monetary Fund; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We model the opportunities and incentives generated by international tax differences for international profit shifting by multinationals. The model considers not only profit shifting arising from international tax differences between affiliates and parent companies, but also from tax differences between affiliates in different host countries. Our model yields the prediction that a multinational's profit shifting in a country depends on a weighted average of international tax rate differences b...
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作者：Reback, Randall
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：This paper examines whether minimum competency school accountability systems, such as those created under No Child Left Behind, influence the distribution of student achievement. Because school ratings in these systems only incorporate students' test scores via pass rates, this type of system increases incentives for schools to improve the performance of students who are on the margin of passing but does not increase short-run incentives for schools to improve other students' performance. Usin...
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作者：Kroft, Kory
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：This paper examines the optimal provision of unemployment insurance (UI) in a framework that accounts for behavioral responses along both the intensive and extensive margins. Two formulations of takeup are considered: in the first, individuals face a takeup cost that is exogenous; in the second, the cost depends endogenously on the takeup rate. Such endogenous costs to takeup lead to a social multiplier, a reduced-form parameter summarizing the strength of social interactions. This paper deriv...
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作者：Zhang, Jie; Davies, James; Zeng, Jinli; McDonald, Stuart
作者单位：University of Queensland; Western University (University of Western Ontario); National University of Singapore; California Institute of Technology
摘要：In a neoclassical growth model with public consumption, we show the following Pareto optimal tax rules. The government should tax leisure and private consumption at the same rate, and subsidize net investment at the same rate it taxes net capital income. Also, it should tax capital income more heavily than labor income. In an extension for home production, the additional rule is to tax investment for home production at the same rate of the tax on private market consumption. These tax and subsi...
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作者：Dahlberg, Matz; Moerk, Eva; Rattso, Jorn; Agren, Hanna
作者单位：Uppsala University; Norwegian University of Science & Technology (NTNU)
摘要：When investigating the effects of federal grants on the behavior of lower-level governments, it is hard to defend the handling of grants as an exogenous factor. Federal governments often set grants based on characteristics and performance of decentralized governments. In this paper we make use of a discontinuity in the Swedish grant system in order to estimate the causal effects of general intergovernmental grants on local spending and local tax rates. The formula for the distribution of funds...
