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作者:Lefranc, Arnaud; Pistolesi, Nicolas; Trannoy, Alain
作者单位:CY Cergy Paris Universite; European University Institute
摘要:We offer a model of equality of opportunity that encompasses different conceptions expressed in the public and philosophical debates. In addition to circumstances whose effect on outcome should be compensated and effort which represents a legitimate Source of inequality, we introduce a third factor, luck, that captures the random factors whose impact on Outcome should be even-handed for equality of opportunity to be satisfied. Then, we analyze how the various definitions of equality of opportu...
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作者:Anderberg, Dan
作者单位:University of London; Royal Holloway University London
摘要:This paper considers how optimal education and tax policy depends on the risk properties of human capital. A key feature of human capital investments is whether they increase or decrease wage risk. In a benchmark model it is shown that this feature alone determines whether a constrained optimal allocation should be characterized by a positive or a negative education premium. In the same model a positive intertemporal wedge is optimal. The robustness of these results is explored in two generali...
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作者:Zivin, Joshua Graff; Thirumurthy, Harsha; Goldstein, Markus
作者单位:University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要:The provision of antiretroviral medications is a central component of the response to HIV/AlDS and consumes substantial public resources from around the world, but little is known about this intervention's impact on the welfare of children in treated persons' households. Using longitudinal survey data from Kenya, we examine the relationship between the provision of treatment to adults and the schooling and nutrition outcomes of children in their households. Weekly hours of school attendance in...
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作者:Gordon, Nora; Knight, Brian
作者单位:Brown University; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要:This paper develops a spatial merger estimator to explain political integration generally and then applies this method to a wave of school district mergers in the state of Iowa during the 1990s. Our estimator is rooted in the economics of matching and thus accounts for three important features of typical merger protocol: two-sided decision making, multiple potential partners, and spatial interdependence. Rather than simply explaining when a particular region is likely to experience a wave of p...
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作者:Abramitzky, Ran
作者单位:Stanford University
摘要:This paper tests a key theoretical prediction of public finance, that local redistribution induces sorting of the population so that less productive individuals are located in communities with more redistribution. Specifically, I use a longitudinal data set to test whether and to what extent the intensive redistribution practiced by Israeli kibbutzim encourages exit of more productive individuals and entry of less productive ones. The findings support the theoretical prediction. Kibbutz-leaver...
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作者:Rothschild, Casey G.
作者单位:Middlebury College
摘要:We study adverse selection using data from an 1808 Act of British Parliament that effectively opened a market for life annuities. Our analysis indicates significant selection effects. The evidence for adverse selection is strongest for a sub-sample of annuitants whose annuities were purchased by profit-seeking speculators, a sub-sample in which advantageous selection resulting from multi-dimensional heterogeneity is unlikely to have been significant. These results support the view that adverse...
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作者:Conconi, Paola; Sahuguet, Nicolas
作者单位:Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal
摘要:This paper examines the impact of policymakers' horizon on the sustainability of international cooperation. We describe a prisoners' dilemma game between two infinitely-lived countries run by policymakers. We show that re-election incentives can act as a discipline device, making it easier to sustain cooperation between policymakers with finite but potentially renewable mandates than between infinitely-lived policymakers. We also show that, when voting suffers from a recency bias, policymakers...
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作者:Ujhelyi, Gergely
作者单位:University of Houston System; University of Houston
摘要:Regulatory caps on contributions to political campaigns are the cornerstones of campaign finance legislation in many established democracies, and their introduction is considered by most emerging ones. Are these regulations desirable? This paper studies contribution caps in a menu auction lobbying model with limited budgets and costly entry. In the absence of entry, contribution caps improve welfare by leveling the political playing field. With entry, however, a competition effect and a bargai...
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作者:Ahn, T. K.; Isaac, R. Mark; Salmon, Timothy C.
作者单位:State University System of Florida; Florida State University; Korea University
摘要:When a public good is congestible, individuals wanting to provide the public good face challenges in forming groups of optimal size, selecting the members of the group, and encouraging members to contribute for the public good. We conduct a series of experiments in which subjects form groups using three different entry and exit rules. The experimental results are analyzed in terms of group size, the level of public good provision, social efficiency, congestion and group stability. We find that...
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作者:Schaltegger, Christoph A.; Feld, Lars P.
作者单位:Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg; University of St Gallen
摘要:The fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending in political economics. For a panel of the 26 Swiss cantons over the 1980-1998 periods, this paper explores the role of fragmented governments on fiscal policy outcomes. We distinguish between two variants of fragmented governments: cabinet size and coalition size. in addition, we analyze whether constitutional rules for executive and legislature as well as formal fiscal restraints shape the size of gove...