-
作者：Hummel, Patrick
作者单位：Yahoo! Inc
摘要：I analyze strategic voting incentives in large elections with three candidates when voting takes place sequentially. Voters have perfect information about their private preferences but do not know the distribution from which other voters' preferences are drawn. If a candidate finishes last in an early voting round, voters deduce that this candidate is likely to be less popular amongst the remaining voters, and the remaining voters almost always have an incentive to stop voting for this candida...
-
作者：Jackson, C. Kirabo
作者单位：Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Existing studies on single-sex schooling suffer from biases because students who attend single-sex schools differ in unmeasured ways from those who do not. In Trinidad and Tobago, students are assigned to secondary schools based on an algorithm allowing one to address self-selection bias and estimate the causal effect of attending a single-sex school versus a similar coeducational school. While females with strong expressed preferences for single-sex schools have better 10th grade exam perform...
-
作者：Andreoni, James; Gee, Laura K.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper compares two methods to encourage socially optimal provision of a public good. We compare the efficacy of vigilante justice, as represented by peer-to-peer punishment, to delegated policing, as represented by the hired gun mechanism, to deter free riding and improve group welfare. Small self-governing organizations often place enforcement in the hands of an appointed leader-the department chair, the building superintendent, and the team captain. This hired gun, we show, need only pu...
-
作者：Halonen-Akatwijuka, Maija
作者单位：University of Bristol
摘要：Besley and Ghatak (2001) show that a public good should be owned by the agent who values the public good the most - irrespective of technological factors. In this paper we relax their assumptions in a natural way by allowing the agents to be indispensable, and we show that the relative valuations are not the sole determinant of an optimal ownership structure but also the nature of human capital and technology matter. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Spataro, Luca; Renstroem, Thomas I.
作者单位：Durham University; University of Pisa
摘要：We analyze tax policies in an intertemporal economy with endogenous fertility under critical-level utilitarianism, both from a positive and a normative standpoint. On the positive side, we analyze the effects of a change in the tax on capital income and on fertility, both separately and combined so as to keep the per-capita public debt constant. On the normative side, we characterize the first- and second-best optimal tax structures, for both exogenous and endogenous labor supply. (C) 2012 Els...
-
作者：Campolieti, Michele; Riddell, Chris
作者单位：Cornell University; University of Toronto
摘要：This paper examines the effect of changes in two key parameters in disability policy: a) the earnings that disability insurance beneficiaries are allowed to earn without losing their disability benefits; and b) automatic reinstatement where beneficiaries can have benefits reinstated without re-application, and re-testing for disability determination. We examine the effects of these policy changes on the probability of employment for disability beneficiaries as well as the flows onto and off th...
-
作者：Esteller-More, Alejandro; Galmarini, Umberto; Rizzo, Leonzio
作者单位：University of Insubria; University of Barcelona; University of Ferrara
摘要：We consider a federation with two layers of government, in which Leviathan policy makers levy an excise tax on a consumption good that generates a negative externality and that is produced in an imperfectly competitive market. When both layers of government are allowed to tax, policy choices are affected also by vertical tax competition. In this setting, tax policy in general is not efficient. We then examine how special interest groups may influence tax policy by lobbying the policy makers. W...
-
作者：Ferreyra, Maria Marta; Liang, Pierre Jinghong
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：We develop a theoretical and computational model of school choice and achievement that embeds information asymmetries in the provision of education. Because school effort is unobservable to households and policymakers, schools have an incentive to under provide effort. This moral hazard affects both public and private schools, although public schools are subject to an additional distortion because of limited competition and fixed funding. Household monitoring of schools can mitigate moral haza...
-
作者：Djajic, Slobodan; Michael, Michael S.; Vinogradova, Alexandra
作者单位：University of Cyprus; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：We examine the interaction between policies of the host and source countries in the context of a model of skilled-worker migration. The host country aims to provide low-cost labor for its employers while also taking into consideration the fiscal burden of providing social services to immigrants. It optimizes by setting a time limit on the duration of a guest-worker's permit. The source country maximizes its net output by optimally choosing the amount of training provided to its citizens, some ...
-
作者：Messner, Matthias; Polborn, Mattias K.
作者单位：Bocconi University; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：We consider a model in which voters over time receive more information about their preferences concerning an irreversible social decision. Voters can either implement the project in the first period, or they can postpone the decision to the second period. We analyze the effects of different majority rules. Individual first period voting behavior may become less conservative under supermajority rules, and it is even possible that a project is implemented in the first period under a supermajorit...
