Sequential voting in large elections with multiple candidates

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hummel, Patrick
• 署名单位: Yahoo! Inc
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.12.002
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 341-348
• 关键词: Elections; strategic voting; Multiple candidates; Sequential voting; Simultaneous voting

摘要

I analyze strategic voting incentives in large elections with three candidates when voting takes place sequentially. Voters have perfect information about their private preferences but do not know the distribution from which other voters' preferences are drawn. If a candidate finishes last in an early voting round, voters deduce that this candidate is likely to be less popular amongst the remaining voters, and the remaining voters almost always have an incentive to stop voting for this candidate. By contrast, sincere voting equilibria can exist under either simultaneous voting or an early voting round of sequential voting without knife-edge assumptions. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.