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作者：Boadway, Robin; Tremblay, Jean-Francois
作者单位：Queens University - Canada; University of Ottawa
摘要：The Tiebout model has been the reference point for the classical approach to fiscal federalism. Its emphasis on mobility, benefit taxation, and the advantages of fiscal competition have informed fiscal federalism since the seminal contributions of Musgrave and Oates. This paper reviews the influence that the Tiebout model has had on fiscal federalism, and argues that while its insights remain relevant for local government, it is far from compelling as a positive description of, or a normative ...
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作者：Earnhart, Dietrich; Segerson, Kathleen
作者单位：University of Kansas; University of Connecticut
摘要：This paper analyzes the influence of financial status on the effectiveness of environmental enforcement. It considers multiple dimensions of both enforcement and financial status. Regarding enforcement, the paper considers both the likelihood of enforcement, as captured by the likelihood of inspections conducted at regulated facilities, and the severity of enforcement, as captured by the size of sanctions imposed on polluting facilities found violating their effluent limits. As indicators of c...
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作者：Nikiforakis, Nikos; Noussair, Charles N.; Wilkening, Tom
作者单位：University of Melbourne; Max Planck Society; Tilburg University
摘要：A normative conflict arises when multiple plausible rules exist, specifying how one ought to behave in a given situation. In such cases, enforcing one normative rule can lead to a sequence of mutual retaliatory sanctions, which we refer to as a feud. We investigate the hypothesis that normative conflict enhances the likelihood of a feud in a public-good experiment. Normative conflict in our experiment arises from the fact that individuals derive different benefits from the public good. We find...
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作者：Gronberg, Timothy J.; Luccasen, R. Andrew, III; Turocy, Theodore L.; Van Huyck, John B.
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; University of East Anglia
摘要：We report the results of a laboratory experiment on crowd-out in a voluntary contribution mechanism public good game. In our setting, a standard argument states that a tax should not be effective in raising contributions, because agents respond by reducing voluntary contributions by the amount of the tax. Our experimental design focuses in on this intuition by abstracting away from several potential confounds. We use a specification for the payoff function in which there is a dominant strategy...
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作者：Sallee, James M.; Slemrod, Joel
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：Notches - where marginal changes in behavior lead to discrete changes in a tax or subsidy - figure prominently in many policies. In this paper, we analyze notches in fuel economy policies, which aim to reduce negative externalities associated with fuel consumption. We provide evidence that automakers respond to notches in the Gas Guzzler Tax and mandatory fuel economy labels by precisely manipulating fuel economy ratings so as to just qualify for more favorable treatment. We then describe the ...
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作者：Aronsson, Thomas; Cialani, Catia; Lofgren, Karl-Gustaf
作者单位：Umea University
摘要：Following the 1987 report by The World Commission on Environment and Development, the genuine saving has come to play a key role in the context of sustainable development, and the World Bank regularly publishes numbers for genuine saving on a national basis. However, these numbers are typically calculated as if the tax system is non-distortionary. This paper presents an analogue to genuine saving in a second best economy, where the government raises revenue by means of distortionary taxation. ...
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作者：Fox, Justin; Van Weelden, Richard
作者单位：University of Chicago; Yale University
摘要：We consider whether a career-minded expert would make better decisions if the principal could observe the consequences of the expert's action. The previous literature has found that this transparency of consequence can only improve the efficacy of the expert's decision making. We show, however, that this conclusion is very sensitive to the specified cost structure: if learning the consequences of the expert's action makes the expert more likely to choose the action most likely to correspond to...
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作者：Traxler, Christian
作者单位：Max Planck Society
摘要：A benchmark result in the political economy of taxation is that majority voting over a linear income tax schedule will result in an inefficiently high tax rate whenever the median voter has a below-average income. The present paper examines the role of tax avoidance for this welfare result. For a right-skewed distribution of taxed income, we show that the political distortion from majority voting is increasing in the median voter's avoidance. Vice versa, keeping the decisive voter's avoidance ...
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作者：Steinorth, Petra
作者单位：St. John's University
摘要：This paper examines market reaction to the introduction of enhanced annuities in a market for deferred standard annuities. The previous literature shows that individuals can try to avoid risk classification by contracting a standard annuity earlier in their life. This paper offers a new perspective to the timing of the annuity purchase under the assumption that individuals already have an idea about their future risk type when young which becomes clearer over time. It shows that enhanced annui...
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作者：Cotton, Christopher
作者单位：University of Miami
摘要：We develop a game theoretic model of informational lobbying between two interest groups and a politician, in which the politician can require political contributions in exchange for access. The analysis considers three claims: (1) the rich have better access to politicians than less-wealthy groups, (2) this access advantage makes the rich better off and skews policy in their favor, and (3) contribution limits can reduce the rich group advantage and result in less-skewed policy. We show that th...
