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作者：Saez, Emmanuel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper analyzes optimal progressive capital income taxation in an infinite horizon model where individuals differ only through their initial wealth. We consider progressive capital income tax schedules taking a simple two-bracket form with an exemption bracket at the bottom and a single marginal tax rate above a time varying exemption threshold. Individuals are taxed until their wealth is reduced down to the exemption threshold. The fraction of individuals subject to capital income taxatio...
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作者：Nyce, Steven; Schieber, Sylvester J.; Shoven, John B.; Slavov, Sita Nataraj; Wise, David A.
作者单位：Stanford University; American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：The strong link between health insurance and employment in the United States may cause workers to delay retirement until they become eligible for Medicare at age 65. However, some employers extend health insurance benefits to their retirees, and individuals who are eligible for such retiree health benefits need not wait until age 65 to retire with group health coverage. We investigate the impact of retiree health insurance on early retirement using employee-level data from 54 diverse firms tha...
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作者：Colombo, Luca; Labrecciosa, Paola
作者单位：Deakin University; Monash University
摘要：This paper studies the impact of commodity taxes on the sustainability of collusion in imperfectly competitive markets. We consider both a Cournot and a Bertrand supergame with discounting, with collusion being supported by either grim trigger strategies or stick-and-carrot optimal punishments. We show that, irrespective of firms' choice variable, and under both punishment schemes, increased reliance on ad valorem taxation makes it easier for firms to sustain a collusive agreement. Contrary to...
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作者：Korenok, Oleg; Millner, Edward L.; Razzolini, Laura
作者单位：Virginia Commonwealth University
摘要：We design an experiment to test whether incomplete crowding out in dictator games can be rationalized by the impurely altruistic preferences. By giving the recipients an endowment of varying levels, we create an environment in which crowding out may occur. We find that the behavior of 66% of the dictators can be rationalized by the impurely altruistic utility function. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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作者：Castillo, Marco; Petrie, Ragan; Torero, Maximo; Vesterlund, Lise
作者单位：George Mason University; CGIAR; International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI); Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Relying on a commonly used fixed-offer bargaining script we examine gender differences in bargaining outcomes in a highly competitive and frequently used market: the taxi market in Lima, Peru. Our bargaining script secures that only the seller can change prices and terminate negotiations, thus we are able to examine differences in the seller's entire path of negotiation and in the reservation price at which they are willing to trade. We find that male and female passengers who use the same bar...
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作者：Calsamiglia, Caterina; Franke, Joerg; Rey-Biel, Pedro
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; Dortmund University of Technology
摘要：Affirmative action policies bias tournament rules in order to provide equal opportunities to a group of competitors who have a disadvantage they cannot be held responsible for. Its implementation affects the underlying incentive structure which might induce lower performance by participants, and additionally result in a selected pool of tournament winners that is less efficient. In this paper, we study the empirical validity of such concerns in a case where the disadvantage affects capacities ...
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作者：Chin, Aimee; Daysal, N. Meltem; Imberman, Scott A.
作者单位：University of Houston System; University of Houston; University of Southern Denmark; Michigan State University
摘要：Texas requires a school district to offer bilingual education when its enrollment of limited English proficient (LEP) students in a particular elementary grade and language is twenty or higher. Using school panel data, we find a significant increase in the probability that a district provides bilingual education above this 20-student cutoff. Using this discontinuity as an instrument for district bilingual education provision, we find that providing bilingual education programs (relative to pro...
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作者：Galiani, Sebastian; McEwan, Patrick J.
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Wellesley College
摘要：The Honduran PRAF experiment randomly assigned conditional cash transfers to 40 of 70 poor municipalities, within five strata defined by a poverty proxy. Using census data, we show that eligible children were 8 percentage points more likely to enroll in school and 3 percentage points less likely to work. The effects were much larger in the two poorest strata, and statistically insignificant in the other three (the latter finding is robust to the use of a separate regression-discontinuity desig...
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作者：Smart, Michael; Sturm, Daniel M.
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：Periodic elections are the main instrument through which voters can hold politicians accountable. From this perspective term limits, which restrict voters' ability to reward politicians with re-election, appear counterproductive. We show that despite the disciplining effect of elections, term limits can be ex-ante welfare improving from the perspective of voters. By reducing the value of holding office, term limits can induce politicians to implement policies that are closer to their private p...
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作者：Guttel, Ehud; Leshem, Shmuel
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Southern California
摘要：Injurers often purchase the property of potential victims to avoid liability or to comply with regulations. This paper shows that injurers subject to cost-benefit standards could profit from buying out victims even if they attach no value to the victims' property. Because buyouts allow injurers to take fewer precautions, a buyout of one victim produces a negative externality for the remaining victims. Injurers can consequently exploit victims, and thereby reduce social welfare, by adopting a d...
