How should commodities be taxed? A supergame-theoretic analysis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Colombo, Luca; Labrecciosa, Paola
• 署名单位: Deakin University; Monash University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.08.001
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 196-205
• 关键词: indirect taxation; imperfect competition; cartel stability; Grim trigger strategies; Optimal punishments

摘要

This paper studies the impact of commodity taxes on the sustainability of collusion in imperfectly competitive markets. We consider both a Cournot and a Bertrand supergame with discounting, with collusion being supported by either grim trigger strategies or stick-and-carrot optimal punishments. We show that, irrespective of firms' choice variable, and under both punishment schemes, increased reliance on ad valorem taxation makes it easier for firms to sustain a collusive agreement. Contrary to the conventional wisdom according to which ad valorem taxation should be preferred on welfare grounds, we find that welfare under specific taxation might be higher than welfare under ad valorem taxation. The main conclusion of our analysis is that traditional welfare results on the comparison between ad valorem and specific taxation based on static models do not necessarily survive in a dynamic setting where the possibility of collusion among firms is taken into account. In response to an increase in the ad valorem tax rate, sufficiently patient firms might find it rational to form an implicit cartel, which would not have existed otherwise. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.