Term limits and electoral accountability

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Smart, Michael; Sturm, Daniel M.
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.08.011
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 93-102
• 关键词: Political agency; ACCOUNTABILITY; term limits

摘要

Periodic elections are the main instrument through which voters can hold politicians accountable. From this perspective term limits, which restrict voters' ability to reward politicians with re-election, appear counterproductive. We show that despite the disciplining effect of elections, term limits can be ex-ante welfare improving from the perspective of voters. By reducing the value of holding office, term limits can induce politicians to implement policies that are closer to their private preferences. Such truthful behavior by incumbents in turn results in better screening of incumbents. We characterize under which circumstances two-term or even longer term limits are the optimal institution for voters. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.