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作者：Kahn, Matthew E.; Mansur, Erin T.
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; Dartmouth College
摘要：Manufacturing industries differ with respect to their energy intensity, labor-to-capital ratio and their pollution intensity. Across the United States, there is significant variation in electricity prices and labor and environmental regulation. This paper examines whether the basic logic of comparative advantage can explain the geographical clustering of U.S. manufacturing. We document that energy-intensive industries concentrate in low electricity price counties and labor-intensive industries...
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作者：Cullen, Julie Berry; Long, Mark C.; Reback, Randall
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Columbia University
摘要：Beginning in 1998, all students in the state of Texas who graduated in the top 10% of their high school classes were guaranteed admission to any in-state public higher education institution, including the flagships. While the goal of this policy is to improve college access for disadvantaged and minority students, the use of a school-specific standard to determine eligibility could have unintended consequences. Students may increase their chances of being in the top 10% by choosing a high scho...
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作者：MacKenzie, Ian A.; Ohndorf, Markus
作者单位：University of Queensland; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：We investigate the efficiency of Coasean bargaining when restrictions are placed on the set of feasible bargaining outcomes. When property rights are costly to (defend) appropriate, we find that bargaining restrictions may be Pareto superior to unconstrained voluntary exchange. Under cost uncertainty over the harmful activity, we show that an efficient configuration of restrictions must balance the potential reduction in appropriation costs with the possibility of allocatively inefficient barg...
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作者：Ouazad, Amine; Page, Lionel
作者单位：INSEAD Business School; Queensland University of Technology (QUT)
摘要：We put forward a new experimental economics design with monetary incentives to estimate students' perceptions of grading discrimination. We use this design in a large field experiment which involved 1200 British students in grade 8 classrooms across 29 schools. In this design, students are given an endowment that they can invest on a task where payoff depends on performance. The task is a written verbal test which is graded nonanonymously by their teacher, in a random half of the classrooms, a...
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作者：Davies, Ronald B.
作者单位：University College Dublin
摘要：An increasing number of international agreements require non-discrimination from their participants, i.e. the government of one country cannot treat foreign firms differently from domestic firms. This is at odds with a government's desire to benefit its own citizens rather than foreign citizens. I show that the use of red tape - a wasteful application process - can achieve de-facto discrimination. Key to this result is firm heterogeneity since, although the red tape cost is the same across fir...
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作者：Hatfield, John William; Kosec, Katrina
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：This paper exploits exogenous variation in the natural topography of the United States to estimate the causal impact of inter-jurisdictional competition on income growth. We find that doubling the number of county governments in a metropolitan area leads to a 17% increase in the average annual growth rate of earnings per employee over 1969-2006, and a 10% increase in 2006 income per employee. Decomposing income effects using 2000 Census worker-level data, we find that approximately half of the...
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作者：Krasteva, Silvana; Yildirim, Huseyin
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Duke University
摘要：Evidence suggests little informed giving. To understand this behavior, we examine voluntary provision of a discrete public good with independent private values that can be ascertained at a cost. We find that an individual who considers a smaller contribution is less likely to learn her value, and thus the percentage of informed giving diminishes as the population grows. We also find that a direct grant to the charity exacerbates crowding-out by discouraging information acquisition whereas a ma...
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作者：Kumano, Taro
作者单位：Yokohama National University
摘要：Public school systems generally use one of the three competing mechanisms - the Boston mechanism, the deferred acceptance mechanism and the top trading cycle mechanism - for assigning students to specific schools. Although the literature generally claims that the Boston mechanism is Pareto efficient but neither stable nor strategy-proof, this study delineates a subset of school priority structures for which it fulfills all three criteria. We show that the Boston mechanism is stable if and only...
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作者：Mittermaier, Ferdinand; Rincke, Johannes
作者单位：University of Munich; University of Erlangen Nuremberg
摘要：We address the role of labor cost differentials for national tax policies. Modeling a tax competition race between two countries competing for a population of mobile firms, we show that in equilibrium, the high-wage country charges a lower tax than the low-wage country. Moreover, under tax competition the high-wage country attracts more firms than in a setting without taxation. Exploiting exogenous variation in labor cost differentials induced by the breakdown of communism in eastern Europe, w...
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作者：de Ree, Joppe; Alessie, Rob; Pradhan, Menno
作者单位：The World Bank; University of Groningen; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; University of Amsterdam
摘要：The purpose of this research is to estimate equivalence scales and evaluate their price and utility dependencies. To do this we unify two strands of the empirical literature on this topic, one that relies on demand data and one that relies on subjective evaluations of wellbeing. This way we are able to employ the strengths of both kinds of information. Equivalence scales are not identified from demand data alone. This is because changes in demographics could affect wellbeing directly, i.e., in...
