Impure altruism in dictators' giving

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Korenok, Oleg; Millner, Edward L.; Razzolini, Laura
• 署名单位: Virginia Commonwealth University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.08.006
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 1-8
• 关键词: dictator game; impure altruism; Incomplete crowding out

摘要

We design an experiment to test whether incomplete crowding out in dictator games can be rationalized by the impurely altruistic preferences. By giving the recipients an endowment of varying levels, we create an environment in which crowding out may occur. We find that the behavior of 66% of the dictators can be rationalized by the impurely altruistic utility function. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.