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作者：Gronau, R
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作者：Gronau, R
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作者：Yun, JY
摘要：This article analyzes the efficiency of the rank-order contract for a finite number of risk-neutral agents under both moral hazard and adverse selection. The first-best outcome is shown to be supported by a set of rank-order contracts which penalize a small fraction of agents but do so heavily. The article also shows how these rank-order contracts compare with these giving a large prize to few agents. Finally, the article provides an informal argument for why firms do not follow a penalty-givi...
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作者：Stevens, AH
摘要：This article examines the long-term wage and earnings losses of displaced workers, using longitudinal data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Consistent with previous research, I find that the effects of displacement are quite persistent, with earnings and wages remaining approximately 9% below their expected levels 6 or more years after displacement. I then show that much of this persistence can be explained by additional job losses in the years following an initial displacement. Worker...
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作者：Cahuc, P; Kramarz, F
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris
摘要：We model a mechanism that makes delegation of authority from a firm to a collective of workers profitable. Power is exchanged for loyalty. The model is tested using a matched panel of French workers and firms. For these firms, we know at two dates (1986 and 1992) whether a firm-level agreement has been signed. Furthermore, at these two dates and for each firm, a representative sample of the employees provides information on the individuals. We show both theoretically and empirically that the v...
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作者：Rosen, S
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作者：Addison, JT; Chilton, JB
作者单位：University of South Carolina System; University of South Carolina Columbia
摘要：Prior theoretical work predicts an underprovision of advance-notice contracts stemming from their enforcement costs. In the present model, it is rather the fundamental inability of workers to alienate their right to quit taken in conjunction with parameters central to job separation decisions that jointly determine the mix of notice and no-notice contracts observed in equilibrium. Not all equilibrium contracts are efficient, but there is no underprovision of notice. Mandating notice cannot imp...
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作者：Chillemi, O; Gui, B
作者单位：Universita degli Studi di Bari Aldo Moro
摘要：We discuss the concept of ''team human capital'' and study the renegotiation of labor compensation after team members privately observe their own reservation wage. As labor productivity can only be high if the number of quits does not exceed a threshold, decisions concerning acceptance of individual wage demands become interdependent. When a team is made up of salaried workers, a peculiar case of efficiency wage results. Moreover, inefficient team dissolution may occur. We then show that ineff...
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作者：Enchautegui, ME
摘要：This article investigates the effects of welfare payments, wages, and unemployment on women's probability of interstate migration. It also investigates if the income attraction of locations varies with recency of labor market experience. Welfare gains increase the probability of interstate migration. Welfare effects are largest for single mothers with small children and stronger among women with no recent labor market experience. The welfare effects, albeit small, are larger than the wage effe...
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作者：Blau, FD; Kahn, LM
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Using Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics data for 1979 and 1988, we analyze how a falling gender wage gap occurred despite changes in wage structure unfavorable to low-wage workers. The decrease is traced to ''gender-specific'' factors which more than counterbalanced changes in measured and unmeasured prices working against women. Supply shifts net of demand were unfavorable for women generally and hurt high-skilled more than middle- and low-skilled women. By analyzing wages, we find supp...
