Voice and loyalty as a delegation of authority: A model and a test on matched worker-firm panels
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Cahuc, P; Kramarz, F
署名单位：
Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0734-306X
DOI：
10.1086/209841
发表日期：
1997
页码：
658-688
关键词：
摘要：
We model a mechanism that makes delegation of authority from a firm to a collective of workers profitable. Power is exchanged for loyalty. The model is tested using a matched panel of French workers and firms. For these firms, we know at two dates (1986 and 1992) whether a firm-level agreement has been signed. Furthermore, at these two dates and for each firm, a representative sample of the employees provides information on the individuals. We show both theoretically and empirically that the voluntary signature of such an agreement induces lower employee turnover given the structure of wages.
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