Information acquisition and use by networked players

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Myatt, David P.; Wallace, Chris
• 署名单位: University of London; London Business School; University of Manchester
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.05.002
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 360-401
• 关键词: NETWORKS; Bonacich centrality; Information acquisition and use; Public and private information

摘要

In an asymmetric coordination (or anti-coordination) game, players acquire and use signals about a payoff-relevant fundamental from multiple costly information sources. Some sources have greater clarity than others, and generate signals that are more correlated and so more public. Players wish to take actions close to the fundamental but also close to (or far away from) others' actions. This paper studies how asymmetries in players' coordination motives, represented as the weights that link players to neighbors on a network, affect how they use and acquire information. Relatively centrally located players (in the sense of Bonacich, when applied to the dependence of players' payoffs upon the actions of others) acquire fewer signals from relatively clear information sources; they acquire less information in total; and they place more emphasis on relatively public signals. (C) 2019 Published by Elsevier Inc.