Pure-strategy equilibria in Bayesian games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: He, Wei; Sun, Yeneng
• 署名单位: Chinese University of Hong Kong; National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.11.007
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 11-49
• 关键词: Bayesian game; characterization; Coarser inter-player information; Pure-strategy equilibrium existence; purification; closed graph property

摘要

A general condition called coarser inter-player information is introduced and shown to be necessary and sufficient for the validity of several fundamental properties on pure-strategy equilibria in Bayesian games, such as existence, purification from behavioral strategies, and convergence for a sequence of games. Our sufficiency results cover various earlier results on pure-strategy equilibria in Bayesian games as special cases. New applications are presented as illustrative examples, including auctions with externalities and risk-neutral bidders, and Bertrand pricing games with asymmetric information. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.