RISK AVOIDANCE UNDER LIMITED-LIABILITY
成果类型：
Note
署名作者：
SUEN, W
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1995.1026
发表日期：
1995
页码：
627-634
关键词：
摘要：
When the expected flow returns from an investment is positive, bancruptcy carries a cost in terms of the future profit opportunities forgone. This paper demonstrates that, under limited liability, the one-shot gain from taking risky projects is offset by the long-term loss resulting from a higher probability of bankruptcy. In a multi-period model, the incentive problems associated with limited liability is less severe than what static models would suggest. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.