DESTRUCTIVE INTERFERENCE IN AN IMPERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MULTI-SECURITY MARKET
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
BHATTACHARYA, U; RENY, RJ; SPIEGEL, M
署名单位：
Western University (University of Western Ontario); University of California System; University of California Berkeley
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1995.1005
发表日期：
1995
页码：
136-170
关键词：
摘要：
A general equilibrium framework is employed to illustrate how the advent of trading in new securities, about which an ''insider'' has private information, might cause a collapse of prevailing security markets. Roughly, securities that allow the insider to hedge his portfolio risk interfere with one other, and in some cases, so much so that these securities cannot simultaneously trade in any equilibrium. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.