Efficient non-contractible investments in large economies
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Cole, HL; Mailath, GJ; Postlewaite, A
署名单位：
University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Pennsylvania
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.2001.2797
发表日期：
2001
页码：
333-373
关键词：
摘要：
Do investors making complementary investments face the correct incentives, especially when they cannot contract with each other prior to their decisions'? We present a two-sided matching model in which buyers and sellers make investments prior to matching. Once matched, buyer and seller bargain over the price, taking into account outside options. Efficient decisions can always be sustained in equilibrium. We characterize the inefficiencies that can arise in equilibrium and show that equilibria will be constrained efficient. We also show that the degree of diversity in a large market has implications for the extent of any inefficiency. (C) 2001 Academic Press.