Preference evolution and reciprocity

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sethi, R; Somanathan, E
• 署名单位: Columbia University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2683
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 273-297
• 关键词: reciprocity; EVOLUTION; preference interdependence

摘要

This paper provides an evolutionary theory of reciprocity as an aspect of preference interdependence. It is shown that reciprocal preferences, which place negative weight on the payoffs of materialists and positive weight on the payoffs of sufficiently altruistic individuals can invade a population of materialists in a class of aggregative games under both assortative and nonassortative matching. In comparison with simpler specifications of preference interdependence (such aa pure altruism or spite), the survival of such preferences is therefore less sensitive to details of the evolutionary selection process. (C) 2001 Academic Press.