Group play in games and the role of consent in network formation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Charness, Gary; Jackson, Matthew O.
• 署名单位: Stanford University; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.09.006
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 417-445
• 关键词: groups; networks; game theory; equilibrium selection; equilibrium refinement; Majority Voting; group play; robust-belief equilibrium

摘要

We study games played between groups of players, where a given group decides which strategy it will play through a vote by its members. When groups consist of two voting players, our games can also be interpreted as network-formation games. In experiments on Stag Hunt games, we find a stark contrast between how groups and individuals play, with payoffs playing a primary role in equilibrium selection when individuals play, but the structure of the voting rule playing the primary role when groups play. We develop a new solution concept, robust-belief equilibrium, which explains the data that we observe. We provide results showing that this solution concept has application beyond the particular games in our experiments. (C) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.