On the informational inefficiency of discriminatory price auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jackson, Matthew O.; Kremer, Ilan
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.06.011
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 507-517
• 关键词: auction; COMPETITION; Discriminatory auction; asymptotic efficiency; efficient markets; Efficient market hypothesis

摘要

We analyze bidding behavior in large discriminatory-price auctions in a common value setting where the number of objects is a non-trivial proportion of the number of bidders. We show that the average price paid in the auction is biased downward from the expected value of the objects, even in the competitive limit. We show that conditional on a signal that falls below a threshold, a bidder bids no more than the expected value of an object conditional on the signal and winning; while conditional on any signal that lies above the threshold the bid is strictly lower than the expected value conditional on the signal and winning. (c) 2005 Published by Elsevier Inc.