Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yildirim, Huseyin
• 署名单位: Duke University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.07.008
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 167-196
• 关键词: sequential bargaining; proposal power; Majority rule; rent-seeking contests; RECOGNITION

摘要

This paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which agents expend efforts to be the proposer. In equilibrium, agents' effort choices are influenced by the prize and cost effects. The (endogenous) prize is the difference between the residual surplus an agent obtains when he is the proposer and the payment he expects to receive when he is not. Main results include: (1) under the unanimity voting rule, two agents with equal marginal costs propose with equal probabilities, regardless of their time preferences; (2) under a nonunanimity rule, however, the more patient agent proposes with a greater probability; (3) while, under the unanimity rule, the social cost decreases in group heterogeneity, it can increase under a nonunanimity rule; and (4) when agents are identical, the unanimity rule is socially optimal. (C) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.