Selection effects in auctions for monopoly rights

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Janssen, Maarten C. W.; Karamychev, Vladimir A.
• 署名单位: Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Tinbergen Institute
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.05.005
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 576-582
• 关键词: aftermarkets; auctions; risk attitude

摘要

We demonstrate that auctioning market licenses may result in higher market prices than assigning them via more random allocation mechanisms. When future market profit is uncertain, winning an auction is like winning a lottery ticket. If firms differ in risk attitudes, auctions select the least risk-averse firm, which, in turn, set a higher price (or a higher quantity, in case quantity is the decision variable) in the marketplace than an average firm. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.