The relationship between top trading cycles mechanism and top trading cycles and chains mechanism

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Krishna, Aradhna; Wang, Yu
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.07.002
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 539-547
• 关键词: Mechanism design; core; indivisible goods; matching

摘要

In this paper, we show that there is a relationship between two important matching mechanisms: the Top Trading Cycles mechanism (TTC mechanism proposed by Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez, 1999) and the Top Trading Cycles and Chains mechanism (TTCC mechanism proposed by Roth, Sonmez, and Unver, 2004). Our main result is that when a specific chain selection rule proposed by Roth et al. is used, these two mechanisms are equivalent. While the equivalence is relevant for one specific case of the TTCC mechanism, it is a particularly interesting case since it is the only version identified by Roth et al. to be both Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.