Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Papai, Szilvia
• 署名单位: Concordia University - Canada
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.012
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 208-235
• 关键词: strategyproofness; indivisible goods; Shapley-Scarf housing market; core

摘要

We show how to restrict trades in exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods so that the resulting restricted exchange markets, the fixed deal exchange markets, have a unique core allocation. Our results on fixed deal exchange markets generalize classical results on the Shapley-Scarf housing market, in which each agent owns one good only. Furthermore, we define the class of fixed deal exchange rules for general exchange markets, and prove that these are the only exchange rules that satisfy strategyproofness, individual rationality, and a weak form of efficiency. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.