Rank-preserving multidimensional mechanisms: An equivalence between identical-object and heterogeneous-object models

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bikhchandani, Sushil; Mishra, Debasis
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105923
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: Rank-preserving mechanism; revenue maximization; multidimensional mechanism design

摘要

We show that the mechanism-design problem for a monopolist selling multiple, heterogeneous objects to a buyer with ex ante symmetric and additive values is equivalent to the mechanism- design problem for a monopolist selling identical objects to a buyer with decreasing marginal values. We derive three new results for the identical-objects model: (i) a new condition for revenue monotonicity of stochastic mechanisms, (ii) a sufficient condition on priors, such that prices in optimal deterministic mechanism are not increasing, and (iii) a simplification of incentive constraints for deterministic mechanisms. We use the equivalence to establish corresponding results in the heterogeneous-objects model.