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作者：Beker, Pablo F.; Espino, Emilio
作者单位：University of Warwick; Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
摘要：This paper analyzes the dynamic properties of portfolios that sustain dynamically complete markets equilibrium when agents have heterogeneous priors. We argue that the conventional wisdom that belief heterogeneity generates continuous trade and significant fluctuations in individual portfolios may be correct but it needs some qualifications. We consider an infinite horizon stochastic endowment economy populated by many Bayesian agents with heterogeneous priors over the stochastic process of th...
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作者：Krueger, Dirk; Perri, Fabrizio
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：Can public income insurance through progressive income taxation improve the allocation of risk in an economy where private risk sharing is incomplete? The answer depends crucially on the fundamental friction that limits private risk sharing in the first place. If risk sharing is limited because insurance markets are missing for model-exogenous reasons (as in Bewley (1986) [8]) publicly provided risk sharing improves on the allocation of risk. If instead private insurance markets exist but thei...
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作者：Hoy, Michael; Zheng, Buhong
作者单位：University of Guelph; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Denver; University of Colorado Anschutz Medical Campus; Children's Hospital Colorado
摘要：This paper presents an axiomatic framework for measuring lifetime poverty over multiple periods. For an individual, we argue that lifetime poverty is influenced by both the snapshot poverty of each period and the poverty level of the permanent lifetime consumption; it is also influenced by how poverty spells are distributed over the lifetime. We axiomatically characterize classes of lifetime poverty indices and derive dominance conditions of poverty orderings for both individual and societal l...
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Yamamoto, Yuichi
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：We study the perfect type-contingently public ex-post equilibrium (PTXE) of repeated games where players observe imperfect public signals of the actions played, and both the payoff functions and the map from actions to signal distributions depend on an unknown state. The PTXE payoffs when players are patient are determined by the solutions to a family of linear programming problems. Using this characterization, we develop conditions under which play can be as if the players have learned the st...
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作者：Habis, Helga; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
作者单位：Maastricht University; Hungarian Academy of Sciences; HUN-REN; HUN-REN Centre for Economic & Regional Studies; Institute of Economics - HAS; Corvinus University Budapest
摘要：We introduce the concept of a TUU-game, a transferable utility game with uncertainty. In a TUU-game there is uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions. One out of a finite number of states of nature materializes and conditional on the state, the players are involved in a particular transferable utility game. We consider the case without ex ante commitment possibilities and propose the Weak Sequential Core as a solution concept. We characterize the Weak Sequential Core and show that it is...
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作者：Hansen, Lars Peter; Sargent, Thomas J.
作者单位：New York University; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We use statistical detection theory in a continuous-time environment to provide a new perspective on calibrating a concern about robustness or an aversion to ambiguity. A decision maker repeatedly confronts uncertainty about state transition dynamics and a prior distribution over unobserved states or parameters. Two continuous-time formulations are counterparts of two discrete-time recursive specifications of Hansen and Sargent (2007) [16]. One formulation shares features of the smooth ambigui...
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作者：Vartiainen, Hannu
作者单位：University of Turku
摘要：We study coalition formation processes of Konishi and Ray (2003) [27]. It is shown that an absorbing and deterministic process of coalition formation that also forms an equilibrium - satisfies a coalitional one-deviation property - does exist if one allows the process to be history dependent. All such dynamic equilibrium processes of coalition formation are characterized. Absorbing outcomes of dynamic equilibrium processes are also identified. It is shown that they always constitute a subset o...
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作者：Toikka, Juuso
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：I extend Myerson's R. Myerson, Optimal auction design, Math. Oper. Res. 6 (1981) 58-73] ironing technique to more general objective functions. The approach is based on a generalized notion of virtual surplus which can be maximized pointwise even when the monotonicity constraint implied by incentive compatibility binds. It is applicable to quasilinear principal-agent models where the standard virtual surplus is weakly concave in the allocation or appropriately separable in the allocation and ty...
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作者：Nocke, Volker; Peitz, Martin; Rosar, Frank
作者单位：University of Mannheim; University of Bonn; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Oxford; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
摘要：In an intertemporal setting in which individual uncertainty is resolved over time, advance-purchase discounts can serve to price discriminate between consumers with different expected valuations for the product. Consumers with a high expected valuation purchase the product before learning their actual valuation at the offered advance-purchase discount; consumers with a low expected valuation will wait and purchase the good at the regular price only in the event where their realized valuation i...
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作者：Hu, Audrey; Offerman, Theo; Zou, Liang
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg; University of Amsterdam
摘要：In a premium auction, the seller offers some payback, called premium, to a set of high bidders at the end of the auction. This paper investigates how the performance of such premium tactics is related to the bidders' risk preferences. We analyze a two-stage English premium auction model with symmetric interdependent values, in which the bidders may be risk averse or risk preferring. Upon establishing the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium, we show that the premium causes the e...
