Ironing without control

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Toikka, Juuso
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.06.003
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 2510-2526
• 关键词: Optimization; Monotonicity constraint; mechanism design; Ironing

摘要

I extend Myerson's R. Myerson, Optimal auction design, Math. Oper. Res. 6 (1981) 58-73] ironing technique to more general objective functions. The approach is based on a generalized notion of virtual surplus which can be maximized pointwise even when the monotonicity constraint implied by incentive compatibility binds. It is applicable to quasilinear principal-agent models where the standard virtual surplus is weakly concave in the allocation or appropriately separable in the allocation and type. No assumptions on allocation rules are required beyond monotonicity. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.