Learning from private information in noisy repeated games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fudenberg, Drew; Yamamoto, Yuichi
• 署名单位: Harvard University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.003
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 1733-1769
• 关键词: Repeated game; Public monitoring; incomplete information; Perfect public equilibrium; folk theorem; Belief-free equilibrium; Ex-post equilibrium

摘要

We study the perfect type-contingently public ex-post equilibrium (PTXE) of repeated games where players observe imperfect public signals of the actions played, and both the payoff functions and the map from actions to signal distributions depend on an unknown state. The PTXE payoffs when players are patient are determined by the solutions to a family of linear programming problems. Using this characterization, we develop conditions under which play can be as if the players have learned the state. We provide a sufficient condition for the folk theorem, and a characterization of the PTXE payoffs in games with a known monitoring structure. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.