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作者：Christensen, Peter Ove; Larsen, Kasper; Munk, Claus
作者单位：Aarhus University; Carnegie Mellon University; Aarhus University
摘要：In a finite time horizon, incomplete market, continuous-time setting with dividends and investor incomes governed by arithmetic Brownian motions, we derive closed-form solutions for the equilibrium risk-free rate and stock price for an economy with finitely many heterogeneous CARA investors and unspanned income risk. In equilibrium, the Shame ratio is the same as in an otherwise identical complete market economy, whereas the risk-free rate is lower and, consequently, the stock price is higher....
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作者：Grimm, Veronika; Mengel, Friederike
作者单位：University of Erlangen Nuremberg; University of Nottingham; Maastricht University
摘要：We study how players learn to make decisions if they face many different games. Games are drawn randomly from a set of either two or six games in each of 100 rounds. If either there are few games or if extensive summary information is provided (or both) convergence to the unique Nash equilibrium generally occurs. Otherwise this is not the case. We demonstrate that there are learning spillovers across games but participants learn to play strategically equivalent games in the same way. Our desig...
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作者：Alvarez, Fernando; Veracierto, Marcelo
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago
摘要：We develop a theoretical model of firm dynamics and unemployment and characterize equilibria with tenure dependent separation taxes. The model is a version of the Lucas and Prescott island model with undirected search. Two equivalent decentralizations are considered: one with spot labor markets and one with long-term employment relations. We model temporary contracts as the special case of a separation tax that only applies to workers with tenure higher than J. While in principle these contrac...
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作者：Bramoulle, Yann; Currarini, Sergio; Jackson, Matthew O.; Pin, Paolo; Rogers, Brian W.
作者单位：Stanford University; Laval University; Aix-Marseille Universite; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; University of Bristol; The Santa Fe Institute; University of Siena; Northwestern University; Northwestern University
摘要：We model network formation when heterogeneous nodes enter sequentially and form connections through both random meetings and network-based search, but with type-dependent biases. We show that there is long-run integration, whereby the composition of types in sufficiently old nodes' neighborhoods approaches the global type-distribution, provided that the network-based search is unbiased. However, younger nodes' connections still reflect the biased meetings process. We derive the type-based degr...
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作者：Zuber, Stephane; Asheim, Geir B.
作者单位：Universite Paris Cite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of Oslo
摘要：The discounted utilitarian criterion for infinite horizon social choice has been criticized for treating generations unequally. We propose an extended rank-discounted utilitarian (ERDU) criterion instead. The criterion amounts to discounted utilitarianism on non-decreasing streams, but it treats all generations impartially: discounting becomes the mere expression of intergenerational inequality aversion. We show that more inequality averse ERDU societies have higher social discount rates when ...
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作者：Rocheteau, Guillaume
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland
摘要：I apply mechanism design to quantify the cost of inflation that can be attributed to monetary frictions alone. In an environment with pairwise meetings, the money demand that is consistent with an optimal, incentive feasible allocation takes the form of a continuous correspondence that can fit the data over the period 1900-2006. For such parameterizations, the cost of moderate inflation is zero. This result is robust to the introduction of match-specific heterogeneity and endogenous participat...
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作者：Mitra, Tapan; Ray, Debraj
作者单位：Cornell University; New York University
摘要：We examine whether the Phelps-Koopmans theorem is valid in models with nonconvex production technologies. We argue that a nonstationary path that converges to a capital stock above the smallest golden rule may indeed be efficient. This finding has the important implication that capital overaccumulation need not always imply inefficiency. Under mild regularity and smoothness assumptions, we provide an almost-complete characterization of situations in which every path with limit in excess of the...
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作者：Gajdos, Thibault; Weymark, John A.
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：This introduces the symposium on inequality and risk. (c) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Strausz, Roland
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：The framework of incentive compatible finite direct coordination mechanisms in the sense of Myerson (1982) [5] is isomorphic to a framework of incentive compatible stochastic mediated contracts in the sense of Rahman and Obara (2010) [11] and Rahman (2009)[10]. The equivalence follows because the framework of Myerson (1982) [5] allows for a correlation between recommendations and transfers. The literature has hitherto not recognized the importance of this correlation for the structure of optim...
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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Gancia, Gino; Zilibotti, Fabrizio
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Zurich
摘要：We study a dynamic general equilibrium model where innovation takes the form of the introduction of new goods whose production requires skilled workers. Innovation is followed by a costly process of standardization, whereby these new goods are adapted to be produced using unskilled labor. Our framework highlights a number of novel results. First, standardization is both an engine of growth and a potential barrier to it. As a result, growth is an inverse U-shaped function of the standardization...
