Transferable utility games with uncertainty

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Habis, Helga; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
• 署名单位: Maastricht University; Hungarian Academy of Sciences; HUN-REN; HUN-REN Centre for Economic & Regional Studies; Institute of Economics - HAS; Corvinus University Budapest
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.06.005
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 2126-2139
• 关键词: Transferable utility games; uncertainty; Weak Sequential Core

摘要

We introduce the concept of a TUU-game, a transferable utility game with uncertainty. In a TUU-game there is uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions. One out of a finite number of states of nature materializes and conditional on the state, the players are involved in a particular transferable utility game. We consider the case without ex ante commitment possibilities and propose the Weak Sequential Core as a solution concept. We characterize the Weak Sequential Core and show that it is non-empty if all ex post TU-games are convex. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.