Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bochet, Olivier; Sakai, Toyotaka; Thomson, William
• 署名单位: New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; Keio University; University of Rochester
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105879
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: Uniform rule; implementation; Direct revelation mechanisms; Manipulation games; Fair allocation

摘要

For the problem of fully allocating a social endowment of a commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences, we study the consequences of manipulation for several families of rules that are not strategy-proof. Given a rule and a true preference profile, we consider the induced direct revelation game, and characterize its equilibrium allocations in terms of the profile. Our results are unequivocal: for any rule we consider, and for each true preference profile, there is a unique Nash equilibrium allocation. For the profile, it is the allocation of the uniform rule (Sprumont, 1991), the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and symmetric rule in this literature. These conclusions are drawn from two distinct sets of assumptions on the rules.