A perfectly robust approach to multiperiod matching problems

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kotowski, Maciej H.
• 署名单位: University of Notre Dame
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105919
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: Matching; Two-sided Market; STABILITY; core

摘要

Many two-sided matching markets involve multiperiod interaction. Traditional cooperative solutions, such as pairwise stability or the core, often identify unintuitive outcomes (or are empty) when applied to such markets. As an alternative, this study proposes the criterion of perfect astability. An outcome is perfect a-stable if no coalition prefers an alternative assignment in any period that is superior for all plausible market continuations. The solution posits that agents have foresight, but cautiously evaluate possible future outcomes. A perfect a-stable matching exists, even when assignments are inter-temporal complements. The perfect a-core, a stronger solution, is nonempty under standard regularity conditions, such as history independence. Our analysis extends to markets with arrivals and departures, transfers, and many-to-one assignments.