Investments as signals of outside options

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Goldluecke, Susanne; Schmitz, Patrick W.
• 署名单位: University of Mannheim; University of Cologne; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.12.001
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 683-708
• 关键词: incomplete contracts; Relationship-specific investments; hold-up problem; signaling games

摘要

Consider a seller who can make an observable but non-contractible investment to improve an intermediate good that is specialized to a particular buyer's needs. The buyer then makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller. The seller has private information about the fraction of the ex post surplus that he can realize on his own. Compared to a situation with complete information, additional investment incentives are generated by the seller's desire to pretend a strong outside option. On the other hand, ex post efficiency is not attained since asymmetric information at the bargaining stage sometimes leads to inefficient separations. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.