Knowing the informed player's payoffs and simple play in repeated games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Habu, Takuma; Lipnowski, Elliot; Ravid, Doron
• 署名单位: Cornell University; Yale University; University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105888
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: Repeated games; incomplete information; Transparent motives

摘要

We revisit the canonical model of repeated games with two patient players, observable actions, and one-sided incomplete information, and make the substantive assumption that the informed player's preference is state independent. We show the informed player can attain a payoff in equilibrium if and only if she can attain it in the simple class of equilibria first studied by Aumann, Maschler, and Stearns (1968), in which the initial stages are used only for revealing information, and no further information is revealed after the initial stages. This sufficiency result does not extend to the uninformed player's equilibrium payoff set.