Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bade, Sophie
• 署名单位: University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Max Planck Society
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.04.012
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 257-262
• 关键词: Random matching mechanism; Non-bossy; Group-strategyproof; random serial dictatorship

摘要

No group-strategyproof and ex-post Pareto optimal random matching mechanism treats equals equally. Every mechanism that arises out of the randomization over a set of non-bossy and strategyproof mechanisms is non-bossy. Random serial dictatorship, which arises out of a randomization over all deterministic serial dictatorships is non-bossy but not group-strategyproof. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.