Communication games, sequential equilibrium, and mediators

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Geffner, Ivan; Halpern, Joseph Y.
• 署名单位: Carnegie Mellon University; Cornell University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105890
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: Long cheap talk; communication equilibrium; Paranoid beliefs; mediators

摘要

We consider k-resilient sequential equilibria , strategy profiles where no player in a coalition of at most k players believes that it can increase its utility by deviating, regardless of its local state. We prove that all k-resilient sequential equilibria that can be implemented with a trusted mediator can also be implemented without the mediator if n > 3k. k . These results match the lower bounds given by Abraham et al. (2008) for implementing a Nash equilibrium without a mediator (which are easily seen to apply to implementing a sequential equilibrium) and improve the results of Gerardi (2004), who showed that, in the case that k = 1, a sequential equilibrium can be implemented in synchronous systems if n >= 5.