Collective decision through an informed mediator

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Li, Yunan; Zhang, Xingtan
• 署名单位: City University of Hong Kong; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105817
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: Collective decision; Provision of public goods; asymmetric information; Cross-subsidization mechanism

摘要

An imperfectly informed mediator (or mechanism designer) must make a decision on behalf of a group of agents, who are privately informed about their valuations attached to the decision. The mediator chooses a mechanism before observing a signal about the agents' valuations and commits to truthfully using this information in the mechanism. We give a necessary and sufficient condition on the mediator's information under which the ex post efficient decision rule can be implemented by an ex ante budget balanced, dominant strategy incentive -compatible and ex post individually rational mechanism. In a large economy, we show that the amount of information that the mediator needs to know about each agent to achieve ex post efficiency is bounded as the number of agents grows to infinity.