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作者：Handa, S; Kirton, C
作者单位：CGIAR; International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI); University West Indies Mona Jamaica
摘要：Using a unique sample of rotating savings and credit association (Rosca) members from Jamaica, we provide the first econometric tests of the recent theoretical advances in the literature on Roscas, and find considerable support for an economic theory of Roscas. We find, for example, that payments to the Rosca leader significantly enhance the sustainability of the Rosca, and that the contractual relationship between the leader and other Rosca members is 'transaction cost minimizing' - when the ...
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作者：de Aghion, BA
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：This paper develops a model of a (laissez-faire) decentralized banking system in which banks are shown to both underinvest in, and undertransmit expertise in long-term industrial finance. Government support for one financial institution ('the development bank') can serve to reduce these problems, but unqualified government support alone is not enough. The efficiency of government sponsorship can be enhanced if certain conditions are attached to that sponsorship. Crucially, these include target...
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作者：Peretto, PF
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：To account for the qualitative differences between developed and developing countries, this paper argues that the expensive in-house R&D that manufacturing firms undertake in advanced industrial economies cannot be supported in countries that are in the early stage of industrialization and do not have sufficiently large markets for manufacturing goods. Such economies grow as standard development models predict: by accumulating physical and human capital and increasing specialization by industr...
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作者：Matthiasson, T
作者单位：University of Iceland
摘要：The model developed in this paper attempts to provide an explanation of the fact that Icelandic vessel owners and Icelandic skippers do not share costs of operation of a vessel. Tn the model, a skipper is contracted to take a fishing vessel to the fishing ground. The skipper is remunerated with a share of the catch, subject to an agreed minimum. Skippers and vessel owners are modelled as if risk-neutral. Skippers develop a fishing strategy which is more costly, the higher the value of the pote...
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作者：Gatsios, K; Hatzipanayotou, P; Michael, MS
作者单位：University of Cyprus; Athens University of Economics & Business; Aristotle University of Thessaloniki
摘要：This paper highlights the importance of the public finance aspects of international migration on wages and welfare. We construct a general equilibrium model of a labor-exporting (i.e., source) or of a labor-importing (i.e., host) country with identical consumers, producing many private traded goods and one public consumption good. Within this framework, it is shown that contrary to the existing literature, international migration may have adverse effects on wages and welfare in both countries,...
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作者：Angelsen, A
作者单位：CGIAR; Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR)
摘要：This paper compares four different modelling approaches to agricultural expansion and deforestation, and explores the implications of assumptions about the household objectives, the labour market, and the property rights regime. A major distinction is made between population and market based explanations. Many of the popular policy prescriptions are based on the population approach, assuming subsistence behaviour and limited market integration. Within a more realistic-particularly for the long...
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作者：Karayalçin, C; Mitra, D
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida International University
摘要：We study a small open economy with two sectors and two factors of production, in one of the sectors, external economies of scale are generated through the industry-level capital input. This leads to a divergence between private and social production possibility frontiers as well as to multiple equilibria. The equilibrium selection problem that arises is solved by agents who follow a simple trial-and-error learning rule. The growth path of the economy as agents learn lies below the production p...
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作者：Laffont, JJ; N'Guessan, T
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole
摘要：The paper reconsiders the relationship between competition and corruption in a model, where corruption has solid informational foundations and where the regulatory response to the possibility of corruption is taken into account. It is shown that the effect of greater competition on corruption depends on the complementarity or substitutability of the two instruments available to decrease information rents, namely low powered incentives and greater competition. The paper concludes with a brief e...
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作者：Ray, T
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：The paper develops a new explanation of sharecropping based on the idea of an incentive equilibrium. It considers a set-up in which a few landlords in a village confront the choice of cultivating their farms by adopting different tenurial arrangements, ranging from owner operation, through the fixed-rental system to sharecropping. These landlords are the only sources of employment in the village, and compete in the wages they pay to their workers. In such an environment sharecropping is explai...
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作者：Li, HG
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：An analysis of the production reports on a panel of state factories in Guangdong province, China, during 1980-1987, reveals very rapid TFP growth. By linking factory performance with local characteristics, we find that the overall market environment has a significant positive impact on the state factories. Even without privatization or similarly drastic reform measures, these factories show remarkable responsiveness to market incentives. Detailed examinations of labor force composition also in...
