Cost sharing and catch sharing

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Matthiasson, T
• 署名单位: University of Iceland
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3878(98)00101-1
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 25-44
• 关键词: cost sharing; remuneration systems; fishing

摘要

The model developed in this paper attempts to provide an explanation of the fact that Icelandic vessel owners and Icelandic skippers do not share costs of operation of a vessel. Tn the model, a skipper is contracted to take a fishing vessel to the fishing ground. The skipper is remunerated with a share of the catch, subject to an agreed minimum. Skippers and vessel owners are modelled as if risk-neutral. Skippers develop a fishing strategy which is more costly, the higher the value of the potential catch associated with that strategy. Costs that accrue are partly pecuniary (and shareable) and partly skipper-specific (and non-shareable). The conclusions of the paper demonstrate that given the assumptions of our model, a vessel owner should prefer a remuneration contract with a positive revenue share and zero cost share. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.