Development banking

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: de Aghion, BA
• 署名单位: University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3878(98)00104-7
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 83-100
• 关键词: expertise; industrial finance; targeting; co-financing; co-ownership

摘要

This paper develops a model of a (laissez-faire) decentralized banking system in which banks are shown to both underinvest in, and undertransmit expertise in long-term industrial finance. Government support for one financial institution ('the development bank') can serve to reduce these problems, but unqualified government support alone is not enough. The efficiency of government sponsorship can be enhanced if certain conditions are attached to that sponsorship. Crucially, these include targeting of development bank intervention, co-financing arrangements and/or co-ownership with private financial institutions. The relevance of the analysis for LDCs is discussed by contrasting the successful historical development banking experience of France with the more recent unsuccessful experience of Mexico. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V, All rights reserved.