Share tenancy as strategic delegation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ray, T
• 署名单位: Cornell University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3878
• DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3878(98)00102-3
• 发表日期: 1999
• 页码: 45-60
• 关键词: Strategic delegation; share tenancy; Oligopsony; incentive equilibrium; strategic complementarity

摘要

The paper develops a new explanation of sharecropping based on the idea of an incentive equilibrium. It considers a set-up in which a few landlords in a village confront the choice of cultivating their farms by adopting different tenurial arrangements, ranging from owner operation, through the fixed-rental system to sharecropping. These landlords are the only sources of employment in the village, and compete in the wages they pay to their workers. In such an environment sharecropping is explained as a form of strategic delegation where a landlord gets extra benefit by having a share tenant and giving him suitable incentives. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.