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作者：Gomis-Porqueras, Pedro; Julien, Benoit; Wang, Chengsi
作者单位：Deakin University; University of New South Wales Sydney; University of Mannheim; Monash University
摘要：Imperfect observability and costly informative advertising are introduced into a standard directed search framework. Capacity-constrained sellers send costly advertisements to direct buyers' uncoordinated search by specifying their location and terms of trade. We show that the equilibrium advertising intensity is nonmonotonic in the buyer-seller ratio. In addition, we also find that price posting dominates auctions since both mechanisms yield the same expected revenue, but the latter results i...
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作者：Kaplan, Greg; Schulhofer-Wohl, Sam
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago
摘要：We analyze the secular decline in gross interstate migration in the United States from 1991 to 2011. We argue that migration fell because of a decline in the geographic specificity of returns to occupations, together with an increase in workers' ability to learn about other locations before moving. Micro data on earnings and occupations across space provide evidence for lower geographic specificity. Other explanations do not fit the data. Acalibrated model formalizes the geographic specificity...
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作者：Pashchenko, Svetlana; Porapakkarm, Ponpoje
作者单位：University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
摘要：Should asset testing be used in means-tested programs? Focusing on Medicaid, we show that in the asymmetric information environment, there is a positive role for asset testing. Our tool is a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents. We find that 23% of Medicaid enrollees do not work in order to be eligible. These distortions are costly: If Medicaid eligibility could be linked to (unobservable) productivity, this results in substantial welfare gains. We show that asset testing can ac...
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作者：Li, Siguang; Weng, Xi
作者单位：Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China; Peking University
摘要：This article rationalizes matrix management in a multiproject organization in which decisions must be adapted to local conditions but also coordinated with each other. Project managers are privately informed about local conditions and communicate strategically via cheap talk. Matrix management is modeled as a randomization over deterministic authority allocations. We show that random authority is strictly optimal when the conflict between adaptation and coordination is very severe or the coord...
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作者：Xie, Jia
作者单位：Bank of Canada
摘要：This article studies the use of information for incentives and risk sharing in agency problems. When the principal is risk neutral or the outcome is contractible, risk sharing is unnecessary or dealt with by a contract on the outcome, so information systems are used for incentives only. When the outcome is noncontractible, a risk-averse principal relies on imperfect information for both incentives and risk sharing. Under the first-order approach, this article relaxes Gjesdal's criterion for ra...
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作者：Phan, Toan
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
摘要：I show that reputation alone can sustain nominal sovereign debt, which is subject to both the risks of default and opportunistic devaluations. Nominal debt combined with a countercyclical exchange rate policy allows more hedging against shocks than real savings if markets are incomplete. Thus, the loss of either repayment or monetary reputation severely affects the government's ability to smooth consumption. The model offers a simple explanation for the Bulow and Rogoff critique, while simulta...
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作者：Pavlidis, Efthymios G.; Paya, Ivan; Peel, David A.
作者单位：Lancaster University
摘要：The probabilistic structure of periodically collapsing bubbles creates a gap between future spot and forward (futures) asset prices in small samples. By exploiting this fact, we use a recently developed recursive unit root test and rolling Fama regressions for detecting bubbles. Both methods do not rely on a particular model of asset price determination, are robust to explosive fundamentals, and allow date stamping. An application to U.S. dollar exchange rates provides evidence of bubbles duri...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Hayashi, Takashi
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of Glasgow
摘要：In a social choice context, we ask whether there exists a rule in which nobody loses under trade liberalization. We consider a resource allocation problem in which the traded commodities vary. We propose an axiom stating that enlarging the set of tradable commodities hurts nobody. We show that if a rule satisfies this axiom, together with an allocative efficiency axiom and an institutional constraint axiom stating that only preferences over tradable commodities matter, gains from trade can be ...
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作者：Felgenhauer, Mike; Loerke, Petra
作者单位：University of Plymouth
摘要：This article studies a situation in which a sender tries to persuade a receiver by providing hard evidence that is generated by sequential private experimentation where the sender can design the properties of each experiment contingent on the experimentation history. The sender can selectively reveal as many outcomes as desired. We determine the set of equilibria that are not Pareto-dominated. In each of these equilibria under private experimentation, the persuasion probability is lower and th...
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作者：Coate, Stephen; Ma, Yanlei
作者单位：Cornell University; Cornerstone Research
摘要：Recent empirical work in public finance uses the housing price response to public investment to assess the efficiency of local durable public good provision. This article explores the theoretical justification for this technique. It points out that the logic justifying the technique for evaluating nondurable public good provision does not translate to the durable case. A model in which investment is determined by the interaction between a budget-maximizing bureaucrat and a community's resident...
